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Will the Real Paul Robinson Please Stand Up?
Robinson's Conflicting Criminal Code
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*
Paul Robinson is widely regarded as one of the world's leading criminal law
theorists. Moreover, Robinson does not spend all of his time in ivory towers; he
drafts criminal codes.' Thus, Robinson's world-view matters to the on-the-ground
application of criminal law.
Although Robinson famously advocates for a wide range of criminal law
distinctions and doctrines, two of the most important aspects of his theory are (1)
his reliance on the difference between conduct and adjudication rules, and (2) the
distinction he draws between "deeds" and "reasons" views of justification.
Robinson takes seriously that some parts of criminal codes are directed toward
citizens as to how to behave, but other rules are meant to guide judges and jurors.
And, he maintains that because justifications are conduct rules for citizens, they
must be guided by the "deeds" theory of justification, because the "reasons" theory
conflates the purpose of rules of conduct with the reasons for having principles of
adjudication.
Here is Robinson's structure. Rules of conduct are the rules for citizens.
They include the acts that are forbidden and the acts that are justified. Principles
of adjudication are rules for judges and juries.4 They include culpability
principles. 5 "Don't hit" is a rule of conduct. "It is worse for the defendant to hit
purposefully" is a principle of adjudication and grading. "You may hit if you are
being attacked" is a rule of conduct. "The defendant may be excused if he thought
he was under attack but was not" is a rule of adjudication.
As for deeds versus reasons, because justifications, such as self-defense and
necessity, tell citizens what they may do, Robinson argues that justifications are
determined solely by the objective facts (the "deeds" theory). Robinson maintains
. Scholar in Residence, NYU Law School, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law;
Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden School of Law. I thank John Oberdiek and Dennis Patterson for
their comments on earlier drafts, and Paul Robinson for early email exchanges on this topic while we
were working on Criminal Law Conversations.
I See Curriculum Vitae of Paul H. Robinson, UNIv. OF PA. LAW SCH., (APR. 23, 2012)

http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/phrobins/cv.pdf.
2 Paul H. Robinson, Four Distinctions That Glanville Williams Did Not Make: The Practical
Benefits of Examining the Interrelation Among Criminal Law Doctrines 10 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.,
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that an act is justified when "there is no net societal harm." 7 "Reasons" theory,
which looks to what the defendant (reasonably) believed, is misguided according
to Robinson because the defendant's beliefs do not determine what the defendant
should do.8 The facts determine that. Rather, the defendant's beliefs, when wrong,
may still excuse him and are thus part of the principles of adjudication. 9 In other
words, people should act only when they are, in fact justified, but not when they
mistakenly believe (even reasonably) that they are justified.
Robinson argues that his structure provides a coherent and clear criminal law
while the reasons theory does not. For example, he claims that "the objective
deeds approach is a dramatically more useful and clarifying conceptualization than
the subjective reasons approach."'o However, Robinson fails to see that his very
own theories about risking and about self-defense incorporate the perspective of
reasons theories. And the combination of deeds and reasons that Robinson
unwittingly advocates leads to profound inconsistencies.
Before setting forth the contradictions within his code, a brief interlude on
epistemic perspectives is necessary. " Following Derek Parfit, Victor Tadros has
recently argued that what is wrong, permissible, justified or required can be
"epistemically relativized."12 That is, we can make any of these moral judgments
from three perspectives: the facts themselves, the defendant's beliefs, or the
evidence available to the defendant.13 Imagine Alice speeds 100 m.p.h. through an
intersection; we will say that this conduct is "risky." However, from an omniscient
perspective-the perspective of the facts-it may be clear that Alice will not hit
anyone. Alice, from the perspective of her own beliefs, will believe the risk that
she will hit someone to be at some level of probability. The evidence available to
Alice, or a similar standpoint such as an "ideal observer" or "reasonable person,"
may have different information than Alice herself and thus lead to a different
assessment (perhaps Alice is distracted and does not see an approaching school
bus). The probabilities assigned by either Alice or the reasonable person will vary
with the information available to that perspective-the speed, the time of day, the
crowd, etc., will all influence the assessment of the risk. And, depending upon the
probability of harm, Alice or the reasonable person can then assess whether taking

SId.

at 95.

Paul H. Robinson, Objective Versus Subjective Justification: A Case Study in Function and
Form in Constructing a System of CriminalLaw Theory, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 343,
8

345-46 (Robinson, Garvey & Ferzan eds., 2009).
9 ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 118-19.
1o Robinson, supra note 8, at 346.
" For further discussion of the nature of risk and how it relates to culpability, see LARRY
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A

THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (2008).
12 VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 217-18

(2011).
"

Id. at 218.
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the risk is justified. In contrast, from the fact-relative perspective, the harm will
simply not occur.
Robinson has laid claim to the fact-relative perspective. Indeed, his
arguments about deeds theory's superiority over reasons theory rely on it.
Specifically, his claim that a mistaken justification is not a justification, but rather
an excuse, turns on the requirement that others should only assist individuals who
are justified based on the facts. Imagine Betty believes that Carla is attacking her,
but Betty is just reasonably mistaken. According to Robinson, Donald should not
aid Betty because she is defending against someone who is not actually attacking
her. Because there is no real threat, she is not to be assisted (Donald may not, say,
throw her a weapon with which to defend herself), no matter how reasonable her
belief is. She may be entitled to an excuse, however, because her belief is
reasonable and so we should not blame her if she harms her putative attacker in
mistaken self-defense.
Notably, Robinson attributes to reasons theorists a belief-relative
perspective.1 4 This would mean that reasons theorists think that one is justified
whenever one believes the justifying facts exist (e.g., a belief one is being
attacked). However, particularly with respect to mistaken justifications, reasons
theorists routinely require that that belief be reasonable,thereby laying claim to an
evidence-relative perspective. 15 This is important because Robinson does not
recognize that portions of his code, whereby he abandons a fact-relative analysis
for an evidence-relative perspective, actually shift him into reasons territory. This
shift in perspective leads to Robinson contradicting himself. Cases with the very
same structure have different answers, depending upon whether Robinson has
adopted a fact-relative view or an evidence-relative view. Unfortunately for
Robinson, these two perspectives cannot peacefully co-exist as the standard for
conduct rules within one criminal code.
Consider three cases.
Alex:
Alex is driving with Betty. Suddenly, Betty turns green and begins to
vomit in Alex's car. Based on these appearances, Alex believes Betty's

14 RoBINsoN, supra note 6, at 101 ("The standard formulation ...
justified if he believes .... '").

provides . . . 'an actor is

5 It may be that Robinson has drawn too much from his debate with Fletcher as to whether
the actor must not only perform the right deed but also perform it for the right reason. However, the
permissibility of the action for reasons theorists does not come merely from a belief, but from
conformity with some objective standard. After all, Fletcher did not advocate just the "right reason"

but also the "right deed."

See also Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and Criminal Liabilityfor

Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 508 (1989) (advocating a "best evidence available"
standard).
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life is in danger, speeds to the hospital, and runs a red light.
Unbeknownst to Alex, Betty's just profoundly hungover.
Did Alex behave negligently? According to Robinson, criminal law's rules of
conduct do not prohibit Alex's behavior. Robinson views this as an actus reus
question. This is not about justification; this is not about excuse; this is not a mens
rea problem. Rather, according to Robinson, Alex has not performed the actus
reus of a risk creation offense because his conduct did not create a prohibited risk.
Specifically, Robinson has argued that criminal codes only define the mens rea of
reckless and negligent conduct, but they need an actus reus of "creating a
prohibited risk" as well. He has suggested the following formulation of a
prohibited risk: "An actor creates a 'prohibited risk' when he creates a substantial
and unjustified risk that a prohibited result will occur. A risk is substantial and
unjustified if, given its nature, degree, and circumstances, its creation is a deviation
from the standard of care of a reasonable person."1 6 He alternatively offers: "A
'prohibited risk' is a risk that is of such a likelihood and of such a harm that the
reasonable person would not judge it to be justified by the circumstances." 17 Alex
speeds because he mistakenly believes he needs to get Betty to the hospital. This
is not a prohibited risk under Robinson's formula. A reasonable person would act
as Alex does.
Can Robinson rely just on the speeding itself and not on the reason for
speeding? No. Notice that it has to matter why Alex is speeding for Robinson's
formulation. Indeed, both of his suggested formulations specifically take into
account whether the risk is justified. Moreover, the justification has to be taken
from the ex ante perspective. Otherwise, whenever someone drives, whenever a
construction worker uses dynamite, whenever a baseball player hits a ball that
could fly into the stands, they are imposing a prohibited risk. To cabin the
prohibition, the justification for the risk must be taken into account-normal
driving, building skyscrapers, and playing a popular sport.' 8 But once we take the
justification for the risk imposition into account, then it seems that Alex cannot be
creating a prohibited risk because the risk to life and limb would be deemed
justified by a reasonable person in the circumstances. (Again, the reasonable
person in the circumstances never knows everything because it is never reasonable
to drive if the car will kill someone, never reasonable to use dynamite if it will kill
a bystander, and never reasonable to hit a baseball that will fly into the stands and
kill a spectator. The omniscient do not see risks and would find all and only those
16 Paul H. Robinson, ProhibitedRisks and Culpable Disregardor Inattentiveness: Challenge
and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-Creation Offenses, in 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES INLAW

367, 377 (2003); see also Robinson, supra note 2, at II ("In the context of rules of conduct, the law
must define those ex ante risks that are prohibited.").
17 See Robinson, supra note 16, at 378.
1s See id at 376 (noting that the nature, degree, and justification for the risk and the
community's balance of these factors through the reasonable person standard is required).
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risks that actually cause harm to be prohibited.) From the perspective of beliefs or
evidence, Alex acts permissibly. From the standpoint of facts, he does not.
Robinson concludes Alex has not violated the actus reus conduct rule.
Darryl:
Carl is attacking Darryl. Just as Carl lifts up a knife to throw at Darryl,
Darryl shoots Carl with a gun.
Now, assume that we want to question whether Darryl is justified. Let us
assume that we can know that Carl would have changed his mind (perhaps Carl has
changed his mind in the past, we have a diary, and so forth). According to
Robinson, despite the chance that the aggressor may renounce, self-defense is
justified. One is justified to act in self-defense when the attack is immediately
necessary, and one need not wait until the attack is imminent. In considering the
imminence requirement, Robinson opines:
Such a view is not entirely inappropriate since it gives A the opportunity
to change his mind about killing D, and it thereby avoids the loss of
either life. But one may disagree as to whether it is appropriate to give
the opportunity to A at D's expense, by forcing D to risk the chance that
A will decide to kill him a day earlier.19
Here, Robinson allows D to act despite the fact that it may ultimately be
unnecessary. In the context of a justification defense, Robinson considers whether
it is unfair to force D to bear the risk of error in determining whether D has a
justification defense and concludes that it is unfair to ask D to wait for certainty.
Recall that Robinson tells us that an act is justified when there is no net social
harm. With respect to self-defense, the necessity limitation exists so that one does
not kill aggressors, even culpable ones, if one does not have to. One role of
imminence, or the immediately necessary rule advocated by Robinson above, is to
serve as a "proxy" for necessity. We only want defenders to kill when it is
necessary and thus require them to wait until the last possible minute.
Notice then that what imminence is about is risk. We require the defender to
wait because there is some chance the aggressor will not go through with the
attack. However, even at the point of immediate necessity, it may nevertheless be
true that the aggressor would not have gone through with the attack. Here, because
Carl was not going to go through with the attack, Darryl did cause a net social
harm as he killed an aggressor whom it was unnecessary to kill. Darryl is belief
and evidence-relative justified, but fact-relative unjustified. In this case, Robinson
concludes that Darryl is justified and he allows Darryl to act based on reasonable
appearances.
19 PAUL H. ROBINsON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 79 (1984).
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Ellen:
Ellen is taking her nightly jog. Out of nowhere, Fred runs up behind her
and grabs her arm. Fearing that this person may be just about to attack
her, Ellen stabs Fred. As it turns out, Fred was trying to catch up to
Ellen to give her the keys she had dropped.
What result here? Robinson says that Ellen has made a mistake as to justification.
She is excused, but she has not done the right thing. 20 Notice again, that Ellen is
belief and evidence-relative justified, but she is fact-relative unjustified. Robinson
concludes that Ellen is not justified, based on the facts.
The problem for Robinson is that all three cases have exactly the same
structure. Alex incorrectly believes Betty is sick; Darryl incorrectly believes that
Carl will kill him; and Ellen incorrectly believes that Fred is about to attack her.
None of them create a net social benefit-no speeding is authorized for hangovers,
no killing is authorized when unnecessary, and no killings are authorized for false
beliefs about good Samaritans. But, in each case, the person acts as a reasonable
21
person would. Yet, in cases one and two, Robinson privileges the reasonableness
of the belief in allowing Alex to run red lights and Darryl to respond to immediate
threats, but he denies that reasonable beliefs serve any ex ante conduct rule
function for Ellen. The problem is that Robinson does not see that the evidencerelative perspective is precisely the territory that reasons theorists claim when they
say that Ellen's reasonable belief-that is, the belief from an objective, evidencerelative perspective-allows her to act. If Robinson is going to allow risks to
matter, thereby denying that Alex has committed the actus reus and that Darryl has
made a wrong prediction, then he must also allow Ellen to act based on risks she
perceives. Either "reasonable and wrong" can exist within a conduct rule or it
cannot. But Robinson must choose whether he is truly a deeds theorist, or a
reasons theorist in disguise.

20 ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 100-01 (jogger-mistaken-for-attacker is example of mistaken
reasonable belief which functions as an excuse).
21 I am leaving aside my own skepticism about negligence. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra
note 11, ch. 3. This is an internal critique of Robinson's position.

